

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM	The Today Show	STATION	WRC TV NBC Network
DATE	April 21, 1975 7:00 AM	CITY	Washington, D.C.

AN INTERVIEW WITH SAMUEL ADAMS

BARBARA WALTERS: There has been a good deal of speculation that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese will execute thousands and thousands of South Vietnamese if and when they win the war. Some even speculate that the number could be as many as a million people before this bloodbath ends.

Samuel Adams is a former CIA analyst and he has made a study of this alarming possibility for the CIA. He is in our Washington news center this morning with NBC News correspondent Douglas Kiker.

Good morning, Doug.

DOUGLAS KIKER: Good morning, Barbara.

Mr. Adams, you have estimated earlier that perhaps, not a million but perhaps as many as 100,000 South Vietnamese could be killed. How did you arrive at that figure and who are these people?

SAMUEL ADAMS: I primarily arrived at the figure by looking at Viet Cong documents in which they listed the type of people they wanted to bump off. And then found out how many of these people there were and then took sort of a half-beat guess at how many they'd actually....

KIKER: Well, it's not a haphazard list, is it?

ADAMS: Oh, absolutely not. No.

KIKER: How did they -- who's -- who's on the list, first of all.

ADAMS: Well, you would certainly have President Thieu, just starting at the top, then South Vietnamese policemen, particularly in the special branch, the military security service people, people that worked for the Phoenix program.

KIKER: What is that?  
Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000400050001-8

ADAMS: That is that program which was directed against the Communist party. It was an allied program of both the South Vietnamese and the -- and the Americans.

KIKER: It's an assassination program?

ADAMS: It included assassination, too. Yeah. The object of the exercise was to rub out the....

KIKER: Viet Cong defectors, obviously, would be part of it?

ADAMS: Viet Cong defectors would also be among those that would -- they tried to kill, assuming that the defector had done something wrong to them.

KIKER: What about teachers? When the North Vietnamese captured Hue they rubbed out an awful lot of teachers, educators, they seemed to think that teachers were dangerous. Even though they weren't political, would teachers be on the list?

ADAMS: Conceivably they could, yeah. Some of the -- I presume somebody that -- particularly anti-Communist teachers. The normal, you know, everyday high school teacher, no.

KIKER: And what about the wives and dependents of the people who are scheduled for execution, would they be killed, too, in your opinion?

ADAMS: That, I don't know. I would -- I would think not, no. But you can't tell because families are so close in Vietnam. Sometimes they figure if they're going to kill one guy, they might as well kill his family, too, cause they'll just have a vendetta on their hands if they don't rub them all out.

KIKER: Well now, this list is made up by the North Vietnamese intelligence apparatus. Tell me how that works. It's all directed from Hanoi, isn't it?

ADAMS: Yeah, the -- the outfit that makes a black list is run by the Ministry of Public Security up in Hanoi. It's the same thing as the Soviet KGB. And they've been making these black lists for years, for example, during the Hue massacre when they killed one, two, three thousand guys. They did it off of black lists prepared by operatives who were in -- had been in the city of Hue. And these guys were under control -- ultimate control by the Ministry of Public Security up in Hanoi.

KIKER: How many people do you estimate are undercover agents, double agents, within the South Vietnamese government today? This is how they get their list from informers, right?

ADAMS: The number would be absolutely enormous. Let me just say that it's hard to tell with anything you don't know how they -- what they have left. You know, they've taken over the top half, the top two-thirds of the country, I guess. I would say that before the offensive, they might have had as many as 30, 40, 50,000 agents in the South Vietnamese government and army. Enormous, biggest agent structure in the history of espionage.

KIKER: Well, your former agents say the CIA at one point was only estimating 300, 400, isn't that right?

ADAMS: Yeah, that's right.

KIKER: Well, how -- how could the two figures be so far apart? I know that you arrived at this after careful study of documents and so forth. How could the CIA possibly say there are 500 agents within the South Vietnamese government when there were at least 30,000, probably as you say now, 50,000?

ADAMS: The reason was is that the study had never been done before, nobody had looked at the evidence before. And when -- once you've started looking at the evidence, these guys popped out of the woodwork all over the place, you know, in documents and POW reports and thousands of these guys. And they're the ones who immediately would turn against the South Vietnamese government if and when it falls.

KIKER: They would be the ones who point the finger.

ADAMS: They would be among the ones who point the finger. They also have guys who compile blacklists that, say, live in the village. An average guy -- an average village, say, with a thousand people in it might have three or four guys who do -- whose job it is to compile blacklists of people who support the government.

KIKER: There would be no trial, it would simply be an execution, shot in the back of the head?

ADAMS: There will be some sifting of evidence. I -- obviously these guys can't kill everybody who at one time or another had done something against them or they'd be killing millions. So there will be some kind of sifting out, of deciding who -- who catches it.

KIKER: Some people have expressed the hope that perhaps in an effort to gain world sympathy quickly that the North Vietnamese will not, after all, carry out these executions. Do you believe that?

ADAMS: I tend to believe that they might not carry out as many as they would during the war. They killed an awful lot of people by execution during the war. There's less reason for them to do it now. But I still think they're going -- they'll continue to bump off, you know, many tens of thousands of people.

KIKER: As many as 100,000?

ADAMS: Conceivably. It's a dummy number in a way.

KIKER: Let's say -- let's mention the unmentionable. Let's just say that there are thousands of Americans who are left trapped in Saigon. Do you think that their lives would be in danger?

ADAMS: I think -- oh, yeah. But I don't think primarily from the Viet Cong. I think they'd more likely catch it from the South Vietnamese, just, you know, a South Vietnamese guy, get me an American before I go under myself.

KIKER: What about Cambodia? You studied that country also. Do you think there's going to be any sort of bloodbath there?

ADAMS: I certainly think so. You know, it's -- when they're taking over in other parts of the country; the Khmer Rouge, the Red Cambodians, have killed large numbers of people. Now I just can't see them not doing it. Perhaps they won't, but I just think -- I think that based on their past performance, I think they will.

KIKER: You spent years studying Viet Cong's strength to the CIA, and you came up with estimates which were at wide variates from the official estimates. At the time it was officially estimated at about a quarter of a million Viet Cong operating. You came up with the number 600,000.

ADAMS: That's right.

KIKER: And history has proved you to be correct. Why did the military underestimate the number of the Viet Cong and the CIA for that matter?

ADAMS: Good question. I suppose in the first instance when they had this 250,000 figure, they just hadn't bothered to look at the evidence, that there was a lot more. And then once the evidence was sort of handed to them on a silver platter, then -- then it became a political problem. How do we tell the American public that there's twice as many of the little guys out there as we thought there were?

KIKER: Because the numbers that you came up with would have meant that the troops that we had in there weren't adequate to meet the problem, is that correct?

ADAMS: Absolutely. Yeah, we had to send several hundred thousand more than we did.

KIKER: Well now, after watching this offensive, how -- how many do you think? Do you still think about 600,000 VC?

ADAMS: It depends on how you define them. I would say by one definition, sure, you could easily come up with 600,000. There's an awful lot more out there.

KIKER: Finally, quickly. How long do you think Saigon has?

ADAMS: Oh, a month or two maybe. Maybe not that long.

KIKER: Thank you very much.

We've been talking with Sam Adams, a former CIA analyst. Now back to Barbara Walters in New York.

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000400050001-8

The 1967 Saigon Order of Battle Conference

Estimated Strength of Communist Forces in South Vietnam

<u>Category</u>	<u>August Draft SNIE 14. 3/67</u>	<u>MACV</u>	<u>Conference Agreement</u>	<u>Final SNIE 14. 3/67</u>
<u>VC/NVA Military Force</u>				
Main and Local Forces	121,000	119,000	119,000	118,000
Administrative Services (Support)	40 - 60,000	29,000	35 - 40,000*	35 - 40,000*
Guerrillas	<u>60 - 100,000</u>	<u>65,000</u>	<u>70 - 90,000</u>	<u>70 - 90,000</u>
<u>Sub-Total</u>	221 - 281,000	213,000	224 - 249,000	223 - 248,000
<u>Other Organizations</u>				
Political Cadre	90,000	85,000	75 - 85,000	75 - 85,000
Irregulars (Self-Defense Forces ) (Secret Self-Defense Forces) (Assault Youth )	120,000	---	No Quantification *	No Quantification *
TOTAL	431,000 - 491,000	298,000	299,000 - 334,000	298,000 - 333,000

\* To be qualified in the text of SNIE 14. 3/67

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000400050001-8

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000400050001-8

Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000400050001-8